stock//analyzer~/LLY
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Eli Lilly and Company (LLY)

Pharmaceuticals, including the diabetes and weight-loss drugs Mounjaro and Zepbound.
Market cap: $1.11T
Data as of 2026-07-08
$1,232.00

Overvalued

Trading about 40% above our estimated fair value of ~$880.00.
Estimated fair value: $880.00 (range $350.00–$1.6K)
Today's price
Conservative$350.00 Fair$880.00 Optimistic$1.6K
Confidence: High
Confidence is High (6.9/10): the evidence points clearly in one direction, though it relies in part on normalized estimates, and it is well corroborated by other available signals.

What we think

Eli Lilly's obesity and diabetes drug franchise is genuinely growing fast and is patent-protected until 2036.

But the stock is priced for that growth to continue almost uninterrupted for five-plus years, and Novo Nordisk, the only company to run this exact playbook before, just showed how quickly a GLP-1 growth story can crack.

Our fair-value estimate sits roughly 25–30% below today's price; only our most optimistic scenario supports the current level.

Overvalued.

The bull case & the bear case

The bull case

  • Its weight-loss and diabetes drugs are patent-protected until 2036, with a large market still to capture.
  • A newly approved pill version of its GLP-1 drug and a promising late-stage treatment add to the growth runway.

The bear case

  • Novo Nordisk, the only company to run this exact playbook before, just showed how fast a GLP-1 growth story can crack, guiding to its first-ever revenue decline in 2026.
  • A new US pricing deal has already cut list prices on its key drug by roughly two-thirds for Medicare and discount-program patients.
  • Its older drug (Trulicity) is already declining fast as the newer drug cannibalizes it, a preview of what could eventually happen to the newer drug too.

Key numbers

Revenue growth (3-yr avg)
31.7%
Revenue growth (latest year)
44.7%
Gross margin
83.0%
Operating margin
39.5%
Cash generation
12.8%
Return on capital
33.4%
Debt level
Net debt $35.23B
Growth priced in
40.0%
How it compares to peers: pricier than the typical competitor.

How this company makes money

Eli Lilly earns most of its money from diabetes and weight-loss drugs (Mounjaro and Zepbound), which together make up roughly 80% of revenue and are still growing fast; other areas such as immunology are much smaller and roughly flat.

What would change our view

We'd revisit this call if the price falls below $350.00 or rises above $1.6K.

These are review triggers for us to take another look, not price targets or a promise the stock will reach them.

guest@stocks:~/LLY❯view LLY deep-analysis

Peer Comparison

MetricLLY (subject)Peer median
EV/Sales 17.54x 5.84x
EV/EBIT 44.43x 20.27x
EV/EBITDA 41.23x 16.99x
P/B 41.75x 7.17x
Gross Margin 83.0% 73.1%
ROIC 33.4% 20.0%
ROE 77.8% 33.8%
Rule of 40 N.M. 27.9%
Compared against 10 peers (EDGAR/SIC-mapped): JNJ, ABBV, MRK, AMGN, GILD, PFE, VRTX, BMY, REGN, ZTS.

Deep Analysis: Fundamentals

Eli Lilly is now effectively a GLP-1/incretin company: Mounjaro+Zepbound (tirzepatide) were 64.8% of Q1 2026 revenue ($12.82B of $19.80B), up from 48.4% a year earlier. FY2025 revenue $65.18B (+44.8% YoY); Q1 2026 revenue $19.80B (+55.5% YoY). Net income TTM $25.28B (~35% margin). Balance sheet: $116.6B assets, $43.4B total debt, $5.3B cash, net debt ~$38.1B, equity $31.2B (10-Q, 31-Mar-2026).

Deep Analysis: Income Statement

Gross margin expanding: 81.3% (FY24) → 83.0% (FY25) → 81.9% (Q1'26, mix noise). R&D $13.3B FY25 (20.5% of revenue, down from 24.4% as revenue outgrew spend). Operating margin ex-IPR&D charges: 41.4% (Q1'25) → 48.0% (Q1'26), real leverage, not just lower one-off IPR&D. Diluted EPS $8.26 (Q1'26) vs $3.06 (Q1'25), +170%. TTM diluted EPS ≈$28 (895.9M wtd-avg diluted shares, Q1'26 10-Q); trailing P/E ≈44x; consensus forward P/E ≈29-31x (multiple public estimates).

Deep Analysis: Cash Flow

OCF TTM $20.48B; capex TTM $8.66B (12.0% of revenue, elevated for manufacturing capacity buildout, not a distortion, it's core growth capex); FCF TTM ≈$11.82B (16.4% FCF margin, depressed vs. mature-pharma norms of 25-30% because of the capex surge). SBC TTM ~$633M (immaterial, <1% of revenue). Dividends paid FY25 $5.38B (payout ratio 26.1% of NI, fails the >0.40 DIVIDEND-class gate, confirms GROWTH classification). $15B buyback authorized Dec-2024; $4.1B executed by FY25-end.

Deep Analysis: Balance Sheet

Total debt $43.4B (Q1'26) vs $42.5B (FY25-end), raised to fund capacity capex; cash only $5.3B. Net debt/TTM-FCF ≈3.2x, not high-risk for an investment-grade issuer with 83% gross margins, but leverage has risen materially (FY24 debt $28.5B → FY25 $42.5B, +49%) as the company borrows to build manufacturing scale ahead of demand. Current ratio 1.50x. No liquidity or covenant concern identified.

Deep Analysis: Key Metrics

  • Tirzepatide concentration: 64.8% of revenue (Q1'26) vs 48.4% (Q1'25), rising single-drug-family dependence.
  • Patent cliff: Mounjaro/Zepbound compound patent to US-2036/EU-2037/Japan-2040 (10-K Item 1), long runway. Contrast Trulicity (legacy GLP-1, US patent 2027, already -16% YoY as tirzepatide cannibalizes it, a preview of eventual erosion). Taltz to 2030, Verzenio 2031, Kisunla 2036.
  • Pipeline: R&D $13.3B (20.5% of rev); 25+ Phase 3 program mentions in 10-K spanning obesity/diabetes (orforglipron approved Apr-2026; retatrutide TRIUMPH-1 topline 21-May-2026, NDA ~Q4'26-Q1'27), oncology, immunology, neuroscience. Exact molecule/phase count: UNAVAILABLE.
  • Peer multiple gap: LLY fwd P/E ~29-31x vs Novo ~9x vs big-pharma peers ~9-16x, ~2x the peer group.
  • Gross margin 83.0% FY25 vs 81.3% FY24, expanding.

Deep Analysis: Peer Comparison

Novo Nordisk is the key read-through: after years of GLP-1 hypergrowth, NVO guided its first-ever revenue DECLINE for 2026 (-5% to -13%), CagriSema Phase 3 failed to beat tirzepatide (Feb-2026, stock -16% that day, -56% off highs), Barclays cut CagriSema peak-sales est. 83% ($12B→$2B). JNJ/MRK/ABBV/PFE trade at high-single/low-double-digit forward multiples on low-single-digit growth. LLY is priced as sole survivor of a two-horse race whose rival just stumbled, real edge, but already in the multiple.

Deep Analysis: Macro Environment

Nov-2025 White House/MFN deal cut Medicare/Medicaid tirzepatide price to ~$245/mo and TrumpRx cash price to ~$346/mo (from $1,086 list) starting 2026; Medicare obesity coverage begins, $50/mo copay from 1-Apr-2026, a volume-for-price trade, net effect not yet observable. Formal IRA negotiation eligibility for tirzepatide deferred to ~2031-2035 (statutory exemption), so the bigger structural pricing risk is further out.

Deep Analysis: Insider Activity

97 Form 4s filed 22-Oct-2025 to 16-Jun-2026 (SEC feed); no transaction-level buy/sell codes in feed. Externally: CEO Ricks' 2026 filings show routine RSU-vest tax sales (14,297 sh @ $1,037.15, 1-Feb-2026) plus new grants (38,914 sh, 9-Feb-2026), standard comp mechanics. One notable open-market buy (1,632 sh @ $644.77, Aug-2025) predates the run to $1,235. No net buy/sell conclusion possible; UNAVAILABLE at transaction-code level.

Deep Analysis: Catalysts & Risks

Catalysts (12-18mo): orforglipron US launch trajectory, T2D NDA filing (2026), retatrutide NDA (~Q4'26-Q1'27), TrumpRx volume data, capex-driven FCF-margin inflection. Risks: competitive response, CMS/IRA pricing creep, capacity execution, multiple compression if growth is merely "very good" not "exceptional."

Deep Analysis: Disconfirming Evidence & Falsification

q6: (1) Novo's CagriSema failure shows even the #2 incretin player can miss, orforglipron (12.4% wt loss) already trails oral semaglutide 25mg (~13.6-16.6%) cross-trial; (2) MFN/TrumpRx cuts ~68% off list price are a real, current net-price headwind; (3) Trulicity's -16% YoY previews how fast an incretin franchise erodes once supplanted; (4) debt up 49% YoY funding capex that assumes demand shows up. q7 falsification: Mounjaro+Zepbound YoY growth decelerating below +20% in FY2026 (vs guided +23-27% co-wide), or orforglipron failing to reach a >$2B annualized run-rate within two quarters of launch, falsifies the sustained-hypergrowth thesis priced in.

Deep Analysis: Thesis Review Bands

Two-stage DCF-equivalent (5yr fade + exit multiple, ~8.5% discount rate, ~915M shares): Bear. CAGR ~10%/yr, margin pressure, 14x exit (peer-average, Novo-style derating) → ~$350/sh. Base. CAGR ~18%/yr fading to teens, margin ~34%, 20x exit → ~$880/sh. Bull. CAGR ~24%/yr, margin ~37%, 26x exit (pipeline fully realized) → ~$1,650/sh. Current price $1,236 sits between base and bull, priced for the bull/near-flawless path.

Analyst Checklist, Key Metrics & Key Facts

Analyst Checklist

Implied growth (reverse-DCF)40.0%
Rule of 40 (rev growth + FCF/EBIT margin)N/A
Fear vs. Hope
Hope, not fear. The market is pricing LLY as the emphatic winner of the GLP-1/incretin race with Novo's stumble (CagriSema failure, guided 2026 revenue decline) reinforcing that hope rather than raising doubt. There is little visible fear priced in about LLY's own execution risk, pricing risk (MFN/TrumpRx cuts already active), or the possibility that orforglipron underperforms injectables.
Is It Priced Correctly?
Not on a base-case view. Trailing P/E ~44x and forward P/E ~29-31x (vs. peer group ~9-16x, Novo ~9x) require sustained ~20%+ top-line growth and further margin expansion for 5+ years to be justified by a normalized two-stage DCF; the base-case fair value (~$880/sh) is well below the $1,235.56 price.
Inflection Signals
Two live inflections: (1) the tirzepatide-to-orforglipron/retatrutide handoff, can Lilly convert an injectable monopoly into a multi-molecule incretin franchise before competitors close the gap; (2) the capex-to-FCF inflection, capex is currently 12% of revenue (elevated for capacity buildout); FCF margin (16.4% TTM) should expand toward mature-pharma norms (25-30%) once capacity investment plateaus, likely 2027-2028.
Reverse-DCF Reality Check
No mega-cap pharma has sustained 20%+ revenue CAGR for a full decade at $100B+ scale. The closest and most relevant precedent. Novo Nordisk's own GLP-1 run, sustained strong growth for roughly 2018-2023 before guiding its first-ever revenue DECLINE for 2026 (-5% to -13%) amid pricing cuts, loss of exclusivity in some markets, and a failed next-gen pipeline candidate (CagriSema). Pfizer's COVID-vaccine ramp is a starker cautionary tale of a 2-year spike that fully reversed. LLY's tirzepatide moat (patent to 2036) is structurally stronger than Novo's semaglutide position was, but the reverse-DCF implied growth (needed to justify a ~2x peer multiple for 5+ years) has no clean full-cycle precedent in large-cap pharma.
Unpriced Optionality
Retatrutide's TRIUMPH-1 topline (21-May-2026: -28.3% weight loss at 80wk, largest Phase 3 GLP-1-class signal to date) is not yet in a filed NDA (expected ~Q4'26-Q1'27) and is only partially reflected in consensus estimates; if it becomes a third blockbuster alongside Mounjaro/Zepbound and orforglipron, that is genuine unpriced upside beyond the bull case modeled here. Conversely, non-obesity pipeline (Kisunla/donanemab in Alzheimer's, oncology lifecycle extensions) gets little credit in a stock priced almost entirely on incretins.
Disconfirming Evidence
  • Novo Nordisk's CagriSema Phase 3 failure (Feb-2026) shows even the #2 incretin franchise can miss efficacy targets after years of success. Barclays cut CagriSema peak-sales estimates 83% ($12B to $2B) in response (CNBC, 24-Feb-2026).
  • Orforglipron's Phase 3 weight loss (12.4% completers, ATTAIN-1) trails injectable oral semaglutide 25mg (~13.6-16.6%) cross-trial, per the research digest, the 'easier pill' selling point may not be enough to win share from injectables at scale.
  • The Nov-2025 MFN/TrumpRx deal cut tirzepatide's Medicare/TrumpRx price by roughly two-thirds (list $1,086/mo to ~$346/mo cash, ~$245/mo Medicare/Medicaid), a real, currently-active net-price headwind, not a future risk.
  • Trulicity (Lilly's own prior-generation GLP-1) is down 16% YoY in Q1 2026 as tirzepatide cannibalizes it, a live demonstration of how fast an incretin franchise erodes once supplanted, a risk template for tirzepatide itself later in the cycle.
  • Total debt rose 49% YoY (FY24 $28.5B to FY25 $42.5B) to fund manufacturing capacity that assumes continued demand growth materializes as guided.
Falsification Condition
If combined Mounjaro+Zepbound YoY revenue growth decelerates below +20% at any point in FY2026 (company guided +23-27% overall), or if orforglipron fails to reach a >$2B annualized revenue run-rate within two quarters of its April-2026 launch, the sustained-hypergrowth scenario priced into the stock is falsified and the base/bear case becomes the operative one.
Catalyst Horizon
0-6mo: Q2/Q3 2026 earnings showing orforglipron launch trajectory and TrumpRx volume/price mix; T2D orforglipron NDA filing (2026). 6-18mo: retatrutide NDA filing (~Q4'26-Q1'27) and potential approval; further Novo competitive response; capex intensity beginning to fade as manufacturing capacity completes (targeted ~2027-2028), which should start lifting FCF margin from the current 16.4% toward mature-pharma norms.
Segments
Strongest: Cardiometabolic Health (Mounjaro+Zepbound+Jardiance+Trulicity), $15.76B of Q1'26 revenue (79.6% of total, +71% YoY), driven almost entirely by tirzepatide ($12.82B combined, +108% YoY). Weakest: Immunology, $1.20B (6.1% of revenue), roughly flat YoY as Taltz declined 3.8% YoY ($733M vs $762M) on competitive/biosimilar pressure only partly offset by Omvoh/Ebglyss growth. Within Cardiometabolic, Trulicity is the standout laggard at -16% YoY as it is cannibalized by tirzepatide (all figures: Q1 2026 10-Q, Note 2).
KPI Pack
  • tirzepatide_pct_of_revenue: 64.8% Q1'26 vs 48.4% Q1'25 (10-Q); no direct peer comparable (Novo's semaglutide franchise is a similar concentration but declining, not rising)
  • patent_cliff_core_franchise: Mounjaro/Zepbound compound patent to US-2036/EU-2037/Japan-2040 (10-K Item 1); Trulicity (legacy GLP-1) US patent 2027, already -16% YoY; Verzenio 2031; Taltz 2030; Kisunla 2036
  • pipeline_stage_mix: R&D $13.3B FY25 = 20.5% of revenue (down from 24.4% FY24 as revenue outgrew R&D); 25+ Phase 3 program references across obesity/diabetes, oncology, immunology, neuroscience per 10-K Item 1; exact molecule-by-phase count UNAVAILABLE from extracted filing text
  • gross_margin: 83.0% FY25 vs 81.3% FY24 (10-K); peer big-pharma average roughly 70-75%
  • fcf_margin: 16.4% TTM (depressed by 12.0%-of-revenue capex for manufacturing buildout) vs mature big-pharma norm of 25-30%
  • forward_pe_vs_peers: LLY ~29-31x forward P/E vs Novo Nordisk ~9x vs JNJ/MRK/ABBV/PFE ~9-16x (WebSearch, GuruFocus/other, as of mid-2026)
  • dividend_payout_ratio: 26.1% of TTM net income (10-K), under the 40% DIVIDEND-class threshold, confirms GROWTH classification

Key Metrics (TTM)

FCF Yield
0.8%
ROIC
33.4%
Operating Margin
39.5%
EV/EBITDA
41.23x

Key Facts

  • Mounjaro+Zepbound (tirzepatide) = 64.8% of Q1 2026 revenue ($12.82B of $19.80B), up from 48.4% a year earlier (Q1 2026 10-Q, Note 2).
  • FY2025 revenue $65.18B (+44.8% YoY); Q1 2026 revenue $19.80B (+55.5% YoY); TTM revenue (self-built) $72.25B (10-K + 10-Q).
  • Mounjaro/Zepbound compound patent protected to US-2036/EU-2037/Japan-2040; Trulicity (legacy GLP-1) US patent expires 2027 and is already down 16% YoY from tirzepatide cannibalization (FY2025 10-K, Item 1).
  • Orforglipron (oral GLP-1) approved for obesity 2026-04-01, first NME approved under the National Priority Voucher program, 50 days after filing (research digest).
  • Retatrutide TRIUMPH-1 (obesity) topline reported 2026-05-21: -28.3% weight loss at 80 weeks, the largest Phase 3 GLP-1-class weight-loss signal to date; NDA not yet filed, estimated Q4 2026-Q1 2027 (research digest).
  • Nov-2025 White House/MFN deal cuts tirzepatide's Medicare/Medicaid price to ~$245/month and TrumpRx cash price to ~$346/month (from $1,086 list), effective 2026; Medicare obesity coverage with $50/month copay begins 1-Apr-2026 (CNBC, 6-Nov-2025).
  • Novo Nordisk guided its first-ever revenue decline for 2026 (-5% to -13%) and its CagriSema Phase 3 trial failed to beat tirzepatide (Feb-2026); Barclays cut CagriSema peak-sales estimates 83% ($12B to $2B); NVO stock down ~56% from its highs (CNBC, Feb-2026).
  • TTM free cash flow (self-built) $11.82B on $8.66B TTM capex (12.0% of revenue) for manufacturing capacity buildout; total debt rose 49% YoY (FY2024 $28.5B to FY2025 $42.5B) to help fund it (10-K, 10-Q).
  • Stock closed at $1,235.56 on 7-Jul-2026 (all-time high $1,238.06), trailing P/E ~44x, consensus forward P/E ~29-31x, vs. Novo Nordisk ~9x forward P/E (WebSearch, multiple sources).
  • Dividend payout ratio 26.1% of TTM net income (FY2025 10-K), fails the DIVIDEND-class >0.40 payout gate, confirming the corrected GROWTH classification over the prior CYCLICAL misclassification.
Detailed metrics (for analysts)raw model output only. Layer 1 / Layer 2 methodology, conviction, classification. Peer comparison, Deep Analysis and the checklist are shown above.
ClassGROWTH
Quality profileGROWTH_COMPOUNDER

Consensus

Layer 1 · Mechanical screen

SIGNIFICANTLY OVERVALUED
Mispricing score-29.1
ConvictionNORMAL
Model primary IV$1.0K
Model relative IV (peer)$624.85
Model blended IV$873.82
Beta (5y monthly vs market)0.51
Cost of equity / discount rate (WACC)7.5% / 7.3%

Mechanical model output, a screen, not a fair value.conservative screen, understates growth/AI-capex names

Layer 2 · Research (final say)

OVERVALUED
Relationship to L1DATA_INVALID

Two-stage growth-fade + exit-multiple DCF (5yr fade, ~8.5% discount rate, ~915M shares) puts base-case fair value near $880/sh vs. $1,235.56 current price; the price sits between the base and bull scenarios, i.e. it already discounts sustained ~20%+ revenue CAGR, margin expansion, and no Novo-style derating for 5 years.

Today's price
Conservative$350.00 Fair$880.00 Optimistic$1.6K
DATA CAUTION

Research flagged that one or more mechanical-screen inputs look invalid or distorted (e.g. a data-extraction issue or a capex/FCF definition mismatch); the research verdict was independently re-derived from primary filings, not just a check on the same numbers.

Confidence score breakdown

Research sub-score (70% weight)6.0 / 10
Mechanical sub-score (30% weight)9.0 / 10
Weighted confidence score6.9 / 10 → High

Confidence = 0.7 × research sub-score + 0.3 × mechanical sub-score. Mechanical sub-score rewards the Layer 1 screen for agreeing with Layer 2's direction (corroboration), not just for being conviction=NORMAL in isolation.

Data Integrity

Data Notes

  • INFOmacro sourced: US 10y Treasury yield (FRED DGS10) rf=4.48% as of 2026-07-06
  • INFOmacro sourced: IMF real GDP growth forecast 2.30% (2026, country=USA)
  • INFOmacro sourced: Damodaran US equity risk premium 4.46% (Damodaran ctryprem United States row, column 'Equity Risk Premium')
  • INFOmacro sourced: US CPI YoY inflation 4.17% (FRED CPIAUCSL, as of 2026-05-01 vs 2025-05-01)
  • INFObeta sourced: 5y monthly regression vs SPY (yfinance), beta_5y_monthly=0.506
  • INFOQ2 AR divergence / Q3 accruals ratio not computed: accounts_receivable / total_assets not in normalized field set (no fabrication)
  • INFOOWNER_EARNINGS_NORMALIZED: capex $7.8B vs D&A $2.0B (>1.3x = growth-capex bulge); base_fcf lifted to owner-earnings $14.0B (was strict $5.1B).
  • INFOGROWTH_COMPOUNDER_DCF_APPLIED: primary DCF revalued with the GROWTH growth cap g1=0.2377 (was the MATURE cap ~gdp+infl); IV_primary $357.25 -> $1039.80. Remains a conservative mechanical screen vs Layer 2 research.
Educational information only, not investment advice.
guest@stocks:~/LLY❯